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ABSTRACT
This paper provides a broad and general overview of the relationship between the U.S. health care
system and the labor market. The paper first describes some of the salient features of and facts about
the system of health insurance coverage in the U.S., particularly the role of employers. It then
summarizes the empirical evidence on how health insurance impacts labor market outcomes such
as wages, labor supply (including retirement, female labor supply, part-time vs. full-time work, and
formal vs. informal sector work), labor demand (including hours worked and the composition of
employment across full-time, part-time and temporary workers), and job turnover. It then discusses
the implications of having a fragmented system of health insurance delivery--in which employers
play a central role--on the health care system and health care outcomes.
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I.  Introduction and Motivation 
There is no universal provider of health insurance or health care in the United States.  
Rather, a patchwork system of institutions exists, each covering different subgroups of the 
population.  Certain types of health insurance are provided as a condition of employment, while 
other types of health insurance are more readily available when individuals are not employed or 
not fully employed, while still others are available regardless of employment status.  The two 
most significant sources of health insurance coverage in the U.S. are employers, who collectively 
insure 63% of the non-elderly (<65) population, and governments, who collectively cover 17% 
of the non-elderly population (Fronstin, 2004).  Other types of insurance, such as individually 
purchased policies or coverage obtained through other institutions or organizations, cover about 
7% of the non-elderly population with health insurance coverage.
1  But a non-trivial fraction of 
the population, 18% or 44.7 million individuals, are uninsured (Fronstin, 2004). 
As its title suggests, this paper considers the relationship between the U.S. health care 
system and the labor market.  Section II describes some of the salient features of and facts about 
the system of health insurance coverage in the U.S., particularly the role of employers.  Much 
academic and media attention has been focused on the presumption that the relationship between 
                                                 
 
1 Note that some individuals may have more than one source of health insurance coverage, so the sum of 
the fraction of individuals with the various sources of health insurance discussed in this paragraph plus the fraction 
of the population uninsured may add to more than 100%.   3 
the labor market and the type(s) of health insurance coverage available to individuals may 
motivate some individuals and firms to make different labor market decisions than they would 
otherwise, in ways that adversely impact overall labor market performance.  Section III 
summarizes the empirical evidence on this issue, examining how health insurance impacts labor 
market outcomes such as wages, labor supply (including retirement, female labor supply, part-
time vs. full-time work, and formal vs. informal sector work), labor demand (including hours 
worked and the composition of employment across full-time, part-time and temporary workers), 
and job turnover.  But the implications of the relationship between employer provided-health 
insurance and the labor market are not limited to labor market outcomes.  Section IV discusses 
the implications of having a fragmented system of health insurance delivery--in which employers 
play a central role--on the health care system and health care outcomes.  The paper concludes in 
Section V. 
 
II.  Health Insurance Institutions in the United States 
The most prevalent type of health insurance, covering 63% of the non-elderly U.S. 
population, is employer-provided health insurance coverage (Fronstin, 2004).  Some of those 
covered, about half, receive this type of insurance by virtue of their own employment, while the 
rest receive it as dependents of a spouse or parent who is employed.  Employers in the U.S. who 
provide health insurance do so voluntarily, and many individuals (17% of those not self-
employed) work in firms where such benefits are not offered (Fronstin, 1999).  Even in those 
firms where health insurance is provided as a benefit, not all employees are necessarily eligible, 
and those who are eligible must generally elect coverage in order to receive it.  Indeed, only 62% 
of wage and salary workers are eligible to receive health insurance benefits through their own   4 
employment, and 17% of those individuals decline the coverage that is available to them 
(although they may receive health insurance from another source) (Fronstin, 1999).  Some 
employers also provide health insurance to former employees who have retired, so-called 
"retiree" health insurance.  At present, about 29% of firms employing more than 500 workers 
offer health insurance to current and future retirees (Fronstin and Salisbury, 2003, citing the 
Mercer/Foster-Higgins National Survey of Employer-Sponsored Health Plans 2002); the fraction 
of firms offering this coverage, however, has been declining quite substantially over time and is 
likely to continue to decline. 
Various types of government insurance programs cover most, but not all, of the 
population who are not covered by employer-provided insurance.  It is interesting that even at the 
governmental level, there is no single unified health insurance program.  By far the largest 
government health insurance program is Medicare.  Medicare was implemented in 1965 to 
provide health insurance coverage to individuals aged 65 and over, many of whom were left 
uninsured or underinsured upon their retirement when coverage through their former employers 
ceased.
2  Medicare also covers some individuals under age 65, specifically those who are 
disabled and eligible for Social Security Disability Insurance.  Currently, Medicare covers over 
96% of those over age 65, and 3% of those under age 65 (Fronstin, 2003 and 2004). 
Medicaid is a state-run health insurance program funded jointly by the federal and 
various state governments (some states call the program by different names, for example, in 
California the program is referred to as Medi-Cal).  Historically this was a health insurance 
program for public assistance recipients, primarily low income single mothers and their children, 
and also a source of supplemental insurance for the low income elderly.  In recent years it has 
                                                 
2 At the time the federal Medicare program was implemented individuals were not eligible for Social 
Security benefits until age 65.   5 
been expanded to provide coverage to non-welfare-eligible individuals in families with modest 
incomes, particularly children through the SCHIP program (State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program).  There is great heterogeneity across states in the eligibility requirements for Medicaid 
and in the benefits that are actually provided.  Overall, 9% of the elderly are covered by 
Medicaid, as are 13% of the non-elderly (Fronstin, 2003 and 2004).  The federal government also 
provides health insurance to members of the uniformed services and their families.  About 3% of 
the non-elderly population is covered by this type of health insurance (Fronstin, 2004). 
Various other types of private insurance cover about 7% of the non-elderly population, 
and perhaps as much as a third of the elderly population (Fronstin, 2003 and 2004).  These 
include individually purchased policies from private insurance companies (such as Blue 
Cross/Blue Shield), insurance provided through membership organizations such as a trade union 
or professional association, university-provided health insurance for college students, and 
supplemental insurance for the Medicare-eligible elderly (often referred to as Medigap 
coverage). 
This patchwork system of health insurance coverage leaves many people uninsured:  
those who do not have health insurance through their own or a family member' s employment, 
who are not old enough or disabled enough to qualify for Medicare, who are not eligible or 
decline to participate in Medicaid, and who either cannot afford or choose not to purchase health 
insurance in the private market.  The estimated 43 million uninsured individuals in the U.S. 
represent about 17% of the non-elderly population (Fronstin, 2003).  Due in large part to 
Medicare, only a small fraction of the elderly (65+), about one percent, are uninsured. 
It is interesting to consider why the U.S., in contrast to most other developed countries, 
has a health insurance system in which employers are the primary providers of insurance rather   6 
than the government, at least for the non-elderly.
3  The U.S. has repeatedly rejected broad 
attempts to "socialize" either medical care or health insurance provision.  The first such 
initiative, during the 1930s, failed despite the concurrent genesis of so many other government 
social programs (including Social Security, Unemployment Insurance, and the Aid to Families 
with Children program, the precursor to contemporary public assistance programs for low 
income families).  The most recent initiative was the failed Clinton administration attempt at 
national health reform in 1993 (there have been other unsuccessful attempts in the interim). 
Even though there are some limited examples of U.S. companies providing health 
insurance coverage before World War II, employer-provided health insurance, as an institution, 
really came into being during the two decades following the War.  In the absence of universal 
government-provided health insurance coverage, market forces pushed employers into their role 
as the primary providers of insurance.  These market forces are several, and include:  a 
substantial price advantage given to employers through the tax code since firm health insurance 
expenditures on behalf of their employees are not counted as taxable income to either the firm or 
the employees; significant economies of scale that derive from providing health insurance to a 
large group of individuals; and the ability to pool individuals into insurance groups in a way that 
largely overcomes the problem of adverse selection that plagues the individual market for health 
insurance.   
 
III.  Empirical Evidence on Health Insurance and Labor Market Outcomes 
  With this understanding of how the various U.S. health insurance institutions work, we 
can now consider the relationship between health insurance and various different labor market 
                                                 
 
3 It is also interesting to consider why employers are the primary providers of health insurance, but not 
other types of insurance.   7 
outcomes.  This section describes some of the key empirical estimates of the relationship 
between health insurance and labor market outcomes, including retirement, employment, full-
time vs. part-time work, and job turnover.  It does not, however, go into great detail on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the various empirical studies that are cited.  Currie and Madrian 
(1999), Gruber (2000), and Gruber and Madrian (2004) provide greater detail on the data and 
methods used in many of the studies cited in this paper (and many others), and offer opinions on 
the relative merit of the different empirical approaches. 
 
Retirement and the Labor Supply of Older Workers 
Perhaps the most important labor market outcome to consider is employment itself—how 
does health insurance affect individual participation in the labor market?  The potential impact of 
health insurance on labor force participation derives from the fact that for some individuals, 
being employed is the cheapest (and perhaps even the only) way to obtain health insurance, 
while for other individuals, not being employed is in fact the cheapest way to obtain health 
insurance.  Health insurance will be a more important factor in the decision about whether or not 
to be employed for individuals who place high value on health insurance—those with high 
anticipated medical expenditures either for themselves, or their dependents.  Because medical 
expenditures tend to increase with age, individuals approaching retirement should be particularly 
interested in maintaining their health insurance coverage. 
It should not be surprising, then, that the most widely studied facet of labor force 
participation that has been examined in the literature on health insurance and labor market 
outcomes is retirement:  to what extent does health insurance determine when and how 
individuals choose to withdraw from the labor force?  Health insurance is a potentially important   8 
determinant of retirement outcomes because some types of health insurance are more portable 
across the transition from work to retirement than are others.  For example, employer-provided 
health insurance is typically lost upon retirement; in companies that provide retiree health 
coverage, however, employer-provided health insurance is portable—individuals retain their 
coverage even after they retire. Health insurance that comes from a source other than one’s own 
employment would also be portable, including individual health insurance purchased in the 
private market or employer provided coverage obtained as a dependent through one’s spouse (as 
long as the spouse does not lose coverage). 
If health insurance is not portable across the transition from work to retirement, the 
potential loss of health insurance coverage associated with leaving the work force creates a 
deterrent to retirement.  Thus, we would expect retirement rates to be higher among those with 
portable health insurance.  Once individuals reach age 65 and are eligible for Medicare, losing 
health insurance coverage completely is no longer a concern for those workers previously 
covered by employer-provided health insurance.  Thus, after age 65, retirement rates among 
those with non-portable insurance will no longer be lower, and indeed, may increase if 
individuals have postponed retirement until becoming eligible for Medicare.
4 
The empirical evidence on health insurance and retirement largely concurs with these 
theoretical predictions.  Several studies have found consistent evidence that individuals whose 
employers provide retiree health insurance leave the labor force earlier than individuals whose 
employers do not.  For example, Rust and Phelan (1997) estimate that retiree health insurance 
increases the probability of retiring before age 65 by 12% to 29% (the effects vary with age); 
Karoly and Rogowski (1994) and Rogowski and Karoly (2000) estimate effects ranging from 
                                                 
4 If individuals value their current health insurance coverage more than Medicare, which is not implausible, 
there may still be some deterrent to retirement from having non-portable health insurance coverage even after 
individuals are eligible for Medicare.   9 
47% to 62%; while Blau and Gilleskie (2001) estimate effects ranging from 26% to 80%.  
Madrian (1994a) finds that individuals with access to retiree health insurance leave the labor 
market between 6 and 18 months earlier than individuals who do not have access to retiree health 
insurance and are also much more likely to retire before the age of 65.   
Individuals who are covered by non-employment-based health insurance, for example, 
through policies purchased individually in the private market, through trade associations, or 
Medicaid, also have a type of health insurance coverage that is portable across the transition 
from work to retirement.  Rust and Phelan (1997) extend their analysis to these other types of 
portable health insurance, and find that as with retiree health insurance, individuals with such 
coverage also have higher retirement rates than individuals who would lose their health 
insurance coverage upon retirement.  Johnson, Davidoff and Perese (2003) look at the health 
insurance related costs of retiring more generally, and find that the higher are these costs, the less 
likely individuals are to retire. 
One set of institutions designed to increase the portability of employer-provided health 
insurance, both across the transition from work to retirement and across other types of labor 
market transitions as well (e.g. job change), are state and federal “continuation of coverage” 
laws.  These include two well-known federal laws that go by the acronyms COBRA (for the 
Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act) and HIPAA (for the Health Insurance 
Portability and Accountability Act).  COBRA and other similar state-level continuation of 
coverage laws mandate that employers must allow employees and their dependents the option to 
continue purchasing health insurance through the employer’s health plan for a specified period of 
time after coverage would otherwise terminate, even if the employee is no longer employed by   10 
the firm.
5  HIPAA restricts the ability of insurers to impose preexisting conditions exclusions on 
individuals who change their health insurance coverage.
6  Both of these laws reduce the costs in 
terms of potential health insurance coverage loss associated with either retiring or changing jobs. 
Although no research has yet been done on the impact of HIPAA on retirement, Gruber 
and Madrian (1995) examine the effect of COBRA and its state-level precursors on retirement.  
They find that among those with employer-provided health insurance, these continuation of 
coverage laws increase the probability of retiring by 30%; in contrast, among those without 
employer provided health insurance for whom the laws provide no benefit, continuation 
coverage has no effect on retirement.  These results, using a relatively exogenous source of 
variation in the portability of health insurance, confirm that retirement is very sensitive to health 
insurance availability. 
An interesting thing happens at age 65 when individuals become eligible for Medicare.  
Even for those individuals with employer-provided health insurance that does not continue into 
retirement, leaving the labor force no longer implies a loss of health insurance because 
individuals are covered by Medicare.  Thus, Medicare eligibility should provide a strong 
retirement incentive for those individuals not eligible for retiree health insurance.  And indeed, a 
substantial fraction of 64-year-olds do retire at age 65 when they become eligible for Medicare.  
Empirical research has to date been unable to precisely quantify the magnitude of this Medicare 
effect because age 65 also happens to be the Social Security normal retirement age and the age at 
which many pension plans provide full retirement benefits.  With so many other factors 
motivating retirement that are coincident with Medicare eligibility, it is difficult to quantify 
                                                 
5 Minnesota, in 1974, was the first state to pass a continuation of coverage law.  Several states passed 
similar laws over the next decade.  See Gruber and Madrian (1995, 1996) for more detail on continuation of 
coverage laws. 
6 See Berger at al. (1999) for more detail on the health insurance portability aspects of HIPAA.   11 
exactly how big each of the respective effects are.  But the evidence on how other types of health 
insurance affect retirement suggest that Medicare eligibility should be very important as well. 
One idiosyncratic feature of Medicare relative to other types of health insurance that also 
generates interesting variations in retirement behavior is that Medicare only covers individuals 
and not spouses or dependent children.  As a result, the retirement decisions of two individuals 
without retiree health insurance who are both about to turn 65, one with a spouse who is younger 
and the other with a spouse who is older, could be quite different.  For the individual with the 
older spouse, retirement at the age of Medicare eligibility will result in a loss of health insurance 
coverage for neither spouse—both will be covered by Medicare (the older spouse already is).  In 
contrast, retirement at the age of Medicare eligibility for the individual with a younger spouse 
will result in a loss of health insurance coverage for the spouse if the spouse was covered as a 
dependent on the employee' s plan and not through his or her own independent coverage.  
Interestingly, Madrian and Beaulieu (1998) find that men with younger wives are less likely to 
retire than are men with older wives until their spouses also become eligible for Medicare.  Thus, 
retirement is affected by not only one' s own Medicare eligibility, but also the Medicare eligibility 
of one' s spouse. 
Health insurance also impacts the nature of the transition from work to retirement.  Some 
individuals move from full-time work to full-time retirement, while others pursue a more gradual 
transition from work to retirement, moving from full-time work to part-time work (so-called 
bridge jobs), and then eventually to full-time retirement.  Although many older workers, when 
asked, express a desire to make a gradual transition from work to retirement, it may be difficult 
for many to actually do this before becoming eligible for Medicare while also maintaining health 
insurance coverage.  This is because employer-provided health insurance in the U.S. is typically   12 
contingent upon full-time employment; very few employers provide health insurance benefits to 
part-time employees.  Individuals with retiree health insurance, however, can retire from their 
full-time job and move to a different part-time or self-employment job while maintaining health 
insurance through their former employer.  Research has shown that individuals with retiree 
health insurance are indeed much more likely to make a gradual transition from work to 
retirement than are individuals without retiree health insurance (Quinn, 1997).  Thus, health 
insurance that is portable across the transition from work to retirement appears to be an 
institution that enables individuals to retire both when and how they desire. 
 
Health Insurance Eligibility through Government Public Assistance Programs and Labor Supply 
While much of the research on how health insurance affects labor force participation has 
been directed at the issue of retirement, older individuals are certainly not the only ones whose 
employment decisions are impacted by health insurance.  Another margin along which health 
insurance might affect labor market outcomes is through the labor supply decisions of potential 
public assistance recipients.  A key feature of the two primary public assistance programs in the 
U.S. (TANF, or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, and SSI, or Supplemental Security 
Income) is that, in addition to cash and other benefits, recipients qualify for Medicaid—health 
insurance provided by the states to public assistance recipients and (potentially) other low 
income individuals.  Because the groups who qualify for these types of programs—low income 
single female-headed families and the low income disabled and elderly—tend to qualify for low-
wage, low-skilled jobs without health insurance, the coupling of Medicaid with public assistance 
encourages individuals to sign up for and to remain enrolled in public assistance programs.   13 
Overall, the literature suggests that health insurance availability, and Medicaid in 
particular, has either no (Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2000; Blank, 1989; Montgomery and Navin, 
2000; Decker, 1993; Ham and Shore-Sheppard, 2003) or a small effect (Yelowitz, 1995; Moffit 
and Wolfe, 1992; Winkler, 1991) on the labor force participation of low income single mothers.  
This is somewhat surprising given the potential importance of health insurance for this 
population and their children.  On the other hand, there is some evidence that the decision to 
participate in welfare programs, conditional on labor supply decisions, is fairly responsive to the 
availability of health insurance (Ellwood and Adams, 1990; Moffit and Wolfe, 1992; Decker, 
1993; Yelowitz 1996, 1998a and 1998b, 2000), an interesting finding in its own right, and one 
with important public policy implications. 
 
The Labor Supply of Married Women 
Married women, and to a lesser extent married men, are another group whose labor force 
participation is likely to be impacted by the availability of health insurance coverage.  Although 
most of the interest in the effect of health insurance on labor force participation in both policy 
and academic circles has been focused on older workers and public assistance recipients, the 
potential impact in terms of aggregate effects on total hours worked may very well be largest for 
prime-aged workers, particularly married women who are typically estimated to have a large 
labor supply elasticity.  Given the responsiveness or married women to wage changes, one might 
expect sensitivity to the availability of health insurance coverage as well. 
Because most companies that offer health insurance make it available to both employees 
and their spouses, many married women receive health insurance coverage through their spouses.  
Whether or not a married women has health insurance through her spouse turns out to be a very   14 
important factor in whether and how much married women work.  Married women with health 
insurance through their husbands are 7-20 percentage points less likely to work than are women 
without health insurance from their spouse (Buchmueller and Valletta, 1999; Olson, 1998; 
Schone and Vistnes, 2000; Wellington and Cobb-Clark, 2000).  Among those that do work, they 
are much more likely to be employed in part-time jobs that typically do not provide health 
insurance than full-time jobs (Buchmueller and Valletta, 1999; Olson 1998; Schone and Vistnes, 
2000; Wellington and Cobb-Clark, 2000).  Thus, for married women, the lack of health insurance 
from a spouse' s employment seems to have a strong influence in motivating married women to 
find jobs with health insurance themselves. 
Bradley et al. (2005) find large differences in the labor market responses of married 
women to health shocks based on whether these women have health insurance attached to their 
own or their spouse’s job.  This study, which tracks the labor market behavior of working 
married women diagnosed with breast cancer, finds only small reductions in the labor force 
participation and hours worked of women with breast cancer whose health insurance comes 
through their own employment, but large reductions in both labor force participation and hours 
worked for those whose health insurance comes through their spouse. 
In one of the few studies of health insurance and the labor market using non-U.S. data, 
Chou and Staiger (2001) examine the effects of health insurance on spousal labor supply in 
Taiwan.  Before March, 1995 when Taiwan implemented a new National Health Insurance 
program, health insurance was provided primarily through one of three government-sponsored 
health plans which covered workers in different sectors of the economy.  Historically these plans 
covered only workers and not their dependents.  Thus, own employment was the only way for 
most individuals to obtain health insurance.  There was one exception—coverage for spouses   15 
was extended to government workers in 1982, and subsequently to children and parents as well.  
By exploiting this variation in the availability of dependent health insurance coverage, Chou and 
Staiger (2001) are able to identify the effect of health insurance on employment.  They estimate 
that the labor force participation rate of women married to government employees declined by 
about 3% after they were able to obtain coverage as spousal dependents relative to the labor 
force participation rate of women married to other private-sector workers.  They estimate similar 
declines in labor force participation for the wives of private-sector workers following the 1995 
implementation of National Health Insurance which made health insurance available to all 
individuals.  Their results are largely corroborated in an analogous study by Chou and Lui (2000) 
using a different dataset on labor force participation in Taiwan. 
A study of married women' s labor supply in Spain uncovered another interesting link 
between health insurance finance and female labor supply (De la Rica and Lemieux, 1993).  In 
Spain, health care is provided by the government and financed out of a mandatory payroll tax 
paid partially by the firm and partially by the employee.  Payment of the payroll tax entitles both 
workers and their spouses and dependent children to health care, as well as to a pension and sick 
leave.  Among men, compliance with the payroll tax is nearly universal.  Among married 
women, however, over one-quarter of those who are employed work in the "underground" 
economy where "required" taxes are not paid.   
Only two studies have empirically examined the effect of health insurance on the labor 
force participation decisions of prime-aged men.  The first, by Wellington and Cobb-Clark 
(2000), examines the effect of spousal health insurance on the employment decisions of both 
husbands and wives.  As noted earlier, they find large effects of husbands￿ health insurance on 
the labor force participation of married women.  They also find an effect of spousal health   16 
insurance on the labor force participation of married men:  having a wife with health insurance 
reduces husbands￿ labor force participation, although the effect is less than half the size of that 
estimated for married women. 
The only other study of health insurance and employment among prime-age men, Gruber 
and Madrian (1997), exploits the continuation of coverage mandates discussed earlier in the 
context of retirement to consider the impact of health insurance on the transition from 
employment to non-employment and on the subsequent duration of non-employment.  This study 
finds that the availability of continuation coverage increases the likelihood of experiencing a 
spell of non-employment by about 15% and also increases the total amount of time spent non-
employed by about 15%. 
Overall, the body of empirical literature on the effects of health insurance on the labor 
supply of married women and other prime-aged workers gives strong and consistent support to 
the notion that health insurance affects individual labor supply decisions.  When there is a ready 
source of health insurance available not attached to one￿s own employment, individuals 
(particularly married women) are much less likely to be employed.  This suggests that the 
institutional link between health insurance and employment may be a significant factor in the 
employment decisions of individuals. 
There are many other less-studied avenues through which health insurance is likely to 
impact labor supply.  The link between Medicare coverage and the receipt of Social Security 
Disability Insurance for disabled individuals under the age of 65 could act as a deterrent for work 
among the disabled, or at least work that would be sufficient to disqualify them from further 
disability payments and the health insurance (Medicare) that accompanies these benefits.  
University-provided health insurance to students operates in a similar way.  Individuals can   17 
participate in a student health plan if they maintain their student status, which typically involves 
registering for a certain number of credit hours and maintaining satisfactory grades.  
Employment, or at least full-time employment, may jeopardize an individual' s ability to maintain 
status as a student.  Thus, some students who value their health insurance may be deterred from 
entering the labor market.  Anecdotally, this tends to take the form of delaying graduation. 
 
Health Insurance and Job Choice 
Beyond the full- vs. part-time dimension labor supply, health insurance also has the 
potential to impact the initial choice of where to work and subsequent decisions about whether to 
change jobs, including the choice about whether or not to become self-employed.  Economists 
are interested in the issue of job turnover because it is the process by which workers are 
reallocated away from jobs where they are less productive and into jobs where they are more 
productive.  Impediments to productivity-enhancing job turnover are thus a barrier to economic 
growth.   
Why does health insurance impact job turnover?  There are several reasons.  One obvious 
reason is that not all employers offer health insurance.  Individuals who have employer-provided 
health insurance and place a high value on it will be reluctant to switch to a company that does 
not provide health insurance.  In addition, individuals who don' t have employer-provided health 
insurance and who place a high value on it may attempt to find jobs at companies that do provide 
health insurance.  An interesting piece of evidence on this front comes from the behavior of 
married men who are working in jobs without health insurance.  Married men without health 
insurance but who have pregnant wives are two-times more likely to change jobs than married 
men without health insurance whose wives are not pregnant (Madrian, 1994b).  The impending   18 
birth of a child clearly increases the value of health insurance, and these men clearly respond by 
changing jobs, presumably in an attempt to find something with health insurance. 
A second reason that health insurance affects the job turnover decisions of individuals is 
that not all employer-provided health insurance plans are equal, at least not for an employee who 
contemplates changing jobs.  In addition to variation across employers in the generosity of the 
health insurance package in terms of copyaments, deductibles and what is and is not covered, 
there are two more subtle issues to consider.  The first is that many employers exclude 
preexisting conditions for a certain period of time.7  So, even though a new employer and one' s 
current employer may appear to provide identical coverage, the coverage of the new employer 
may in fact be vastly inferior for families with medical problems if these problems are not 
covered under the terms of a preexisting conditions exclusion restriction.  The second issue is 
that employers do not generally offer their employees free choice amongst the universe of 
medical providers in the health insurance plans that they provide.  Thus, an employment change 
that is accompanied by a health insurance change may also necessitate a medical provider 
change.  Individuals who value relationships with their current doctors may be averse to 
changing health insurance plans even if preexisting conditions are not an issue. 
My own research on the relationship between health insurance and job turnover suggests 
that health insurance is indeed an important factor in the decision to change jobs.  One 
interesting finding is that among individuals who have employer-provided health insurance, 
those who also have coverage through the employment of a spouse are much more likely to 
change jobs than those that do not (Madrian, 1994b).  In essence, health insurance coverage 
through a spouse' s employment is portable across the transition from one job to another and is 
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in their health insurance plans.   19 
one way to skirt the preexisting conditions exclusions that may be in place at a new employer.  
Another interesting finding is that COBRA, in addition to motivating retirement among older 
workers, also motivates job turnover among younger workers (Gruber and Madrian, 1994).  
COBRA makes the health insurance from one' s former employer portable across jobs, at least for 
a limited time, but long enough to skirt preexisting conditions exclusions. 
Beyond my own work, the broader literature on health insurance and job choice is more 
divided.  About one-third of the papers studied find that health insurance significantly impacts 
the job choice decisions made by workers, with a potential loss of health insurance as a result of 
job change acting as a deterrent to job turnover, and a potential gain in health insurance leading 
to increased mobility (Cooper and Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994b; Gruber and Madrian, 1994; 
Anderson, 1997; Stroupe, Kinney and Knieser, 2001; Bansak and Raphael, 2005).  Another one-
third of the papers find no significant relationship between job choice and health insurance 
(Mitchell, 1982; Holtz-Eakin, 1994; Penrod, 1994, Holtz-Eakin, Penrod and Rosen, 1996; Slade, 
1997; Kapur, 1998; Spaulding, 1997).  And the remaining third find evidence that varies by 
empirical specification or the sub-group analyzed, or effects that are not statistically significant 
at standard levels (Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996; Brunetti, et al. 2000; Madrian and Lefgren, 
1998; Berger, Black and Scott, 2004; Gilleskie and Lutz, 2002).  It is interesting to note that a 
fair number of the studies that find a significant effect of health insurance on job choice obtain 
estimates that are fairly similar in magnitude—that the potential loss of employer-provided 
health insurance associated with job change reduces job mobility by 25-50% (Cooper and 
Monheit, 1993; Madrian, 1994b; Buchmueller and Valletta, 1996; Stroupe, Kinney and Kniesner, 
2001).   20 
It is also interesting to consider the relationship between health insurance and job 
turnover from the employer' s perspective.  For an employer that offers health insurance 
coverage, a sick employee is costly in two ways.  First, a sick employee may be less productive.  
Second, a sick employee (or a healthy employee with sick dependents) is likely to generate 
higher insurance claims.  Because of their medical expenditures, these employees may be 
relatively more attractive targets for layoffs.  The link between health insurance and employment 
may thus have an adverse impact on families with medical problems if these problems lead to 
claims-based layoffs (see Anderson 1997). 
 
Health Insurance and Labor Demand 
In addition to its impact of the employment and job choice decisions of individuals, 
health insurance may also affect the labor demand decisions of employers.  There are two 
features of health insurance provision that are particularly salient in this regard.  The first is that 
health insurance is a fixed cost of employment.  Expected employer expenditures on health 
insurance do not increase when the weekly hours worked by their employees increase, and they 
do not increase when compensation increases.  They only increase when more employees are 
hired.  This feature of employer-provided health insurance, its fixed-cost nature, gives firms an 
incentive to economize on the costs of providing health insurance in two ways.  The first is by 
hiring fewer employees but at longer weekly hours—this is one way to maintain production 
while reducing the overall costs of providing health insurance.  The second is by hiring fewer but 
more productive employees—employees who can produce more than the average employee 
would.  Cutler and Madrian (1998) provide partial evidence that firms have substituted long 
weekly hours for fewer workers as health insurance costs have increased over recent years.    21 
Moreover, the effects are nontrivial.  The increase in weekly hours associated with the increase 
in health insurance costs between 1980 and 1993 resulted in a change in average weekly hours 
among those with health insurance equivalent to roughly half the change in labor input that is 
observed in a typical recession.  Baicker and Chandra (2005) examine the impact of rising health 
insurance costs on employment and find that a 10 percent increase in health premiums reduces 
the aggregate employment rate by 1.6 percent. 
The second feature of health insurance that is salient to the labor demand decision is the 
distinction between full- and part-time workers in the tax treatment of employer expenditures on 
health insurance.  Employer expenditures on health insurance are usually not subject to 
taxation—with one caveat: employers must satisfy a set of Internal Revenue Service 
nondiscrimination rules which stipulate that if a firm is to provide health insurance, it must make 
it widely available to substantively all employees.  In essence, employers cannot selectively 
decide that they will provide health insurance to some employees and not to others, either 
because of favoritism, or as a cost-saving measure.  However, certain groups of employees, 
namely part-time, temporary and seasonal workers, are exempt from the requirements of the 
nondiscrimination rules.  Thus, employers can deny health insurance coverage to part-time, 
temporary and seasonal workers while still obtaining favorable tax treatment for their health 
insurance expenditures on full-time permanent employees.  As health insurance becomes more 
expensive to provide, the non-discrimination rules give employers an incentive to hire part-time 
and temporary workers in lieu of full-time workers as a way to economize on insurance 
expenditures.  This could account for some of the phenomenal growth in the temporary services 
industry over the past two decades.   22 
More concrete evidence that employers substitute from full- to part-time workers in the 
face of higher health insurance costs comes from the state of Hawaii.  In 1974, Hawaii mandated 
employer provision of health insurance to full-time, but not part-time workers.  Thurston (1997) 
finds that those industries most affected by the mandate, namely industries in which relatively 
few full-time workers were covered by health insurance, saw large increases in the fraction of 
workers employed in part-time jobs.  In contrast, industries in which almost all full-time 
employees were already receiving health insurance saw little shift in the fraction of full- vs. part-
time workers.  Baicker and Chandra (2005) also find a shift to part-time employment as a result 
of recent increases in health insurance costs. 
Thus, health insurance affects both the size and composition of the work force that firms'  
employ.  As health insurance becomes more costly to provide, employers have an incentive to 
reduce their health insurance costs by substituting overtime for employment, skilled labor for 
unskilled labor, and part-time and temporary workers for regular full-time employees. 
 
Health Insurance and Wages 
A final labor market outcome of interest, wages, is determined jointly by the labor supply 
decisions of individuals and the labor demand decisions of employers.  From the firm’s 
perspective, providing health insurance imposes an additional compensation cost on the 
employer and will reduce the level of wages it is willing to offer for a given level of labor input.  
From the worker’s perspective, employer-provided health insurance is simply another form of 
compensation and will reduce the level of wages required to supply a given level of labor input.  
In a competitive labor market, the level of total compensation received by employees will be 
determined by worker productivity.  The composition of that compensation between wages and   23 
fringe benefits will be dictated by the value that employees place on having employer-provided 
health insurance relative to the cost to the employer of providing it.  If employees value 
employer-provided health insurance at less than the cost to the employer of providing it, the firm 
will not be able to pass the full cost of offering the insurance onto workers in the form of lower 
wages and will opt not to provide health insurance.  That employers do provide health insurance 
would seem to indicate that at least some employees are willing to accept a wage reduction at 
least equivalent to the cost to the firm of providing the insurance. 
Given the inherent risks of being uninsured, risk-adverse individuals should value having 
some sort of health insurance, although as noted above in Section II, there may be more than one 
way to obtain this insurance.  The value to employees having employer-provided health 
insurance have already been mentioned:  the tax deductibility of employer expenditures on health 
insurance, economies of scale from providing health insurance to a large group of individuals, 
and the ability to pool individuals into insurance groups in a way that largely overcomes the 
problem of adverse selection that plagues the individual market for health insurance.  These 
advantages of employer-provided health insurance are potentially large, and we should expect 
many employees to be willing to accept a wage reduction at least equivalent to the cost to their 
employer of providing health insurance.  However, some individuals have cheaper health 
insurance available from another source (for example, the government or a family member), and 
they may place a very low value on having employer-provided health insurance from their own 
employer. 
Despite the strong presumption of a trade-off between wages and health insurance, the 
early literature on this topic was focused not on the magnitude of the wage-health insurance 
tradeoff, but on the reasons why researchers could not find support that there is one (Currie and   24 
Madrian, 1999).  The fundamental problem was a lack of appropriate data for estimating the 
magnitude of any such relationship.  More recent studies that have been careful in both finding 
suitable data and specifying the empirical relationship have found evidence of a wage-health 
insurance tradeoff.  Gruber and Krueger (1991) and Gruber (1994) exploit exogenous changes in 
the cost of benefits offered to workers and find that essentially the full amount of these cost 
increases are passed onto workers in the form of lower wages.
8  Royalty (2003) examines the 
choices that workers make among health plans within a given firm when those plans receive 
different employer subsidies and require different employee contributions and finds evidence of 
an incomplete tradeoff between wages and health insurance.  Baicker and Chandra (2005), 
exploiting variation in health insurance costs driven by variation in medical malpractice 
payments, similarly find an incomplete tradeoff between wages and health benefits.  These 
recent studies all concur that there is a trade-off between wages and health benefits, but the 
magnitude of this trade-off, that is, whether workers are willing to accept a dollar-for-dollar 
reduction in wages in exchange for receiving health benefits or something less, is still open to 
question. 
Health insurance may also affect wages through mechanisms other than a direct trade-off 
between wages and fringe benefits.  For example, health insurance has the potential to affect the 
job matching process.  As discussed earlier, the costs of relinquishing health insurance upon job 
change may lead individuals to remain in their current jobs even if higher productivity job 
alternatives are available.  This productivity loss would presumably result in lower levels of 
compensation as well.  Gruber and Madrian (1997) find evidence that unemployed individuals 
                                                 
 
8 Gruber and Krueger (1991) exploit changes across states in the cost of offering workers compensation 
insurance that are largely driven by changes in the medical component of workers compensation.  Gruber (1994) 
exploits the widespread adoption of maternity benefits following the Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 to 
estimate the impact on wages of this type of additional health insurance.   25 
who have access to continued health insurance coverage while out of work spend more time 
unemployed (presumably searching for better jobs) and are subsequently reemployed at higher 
wages. 
 
IV.   The U.S. Health Insurance System and Health Care Outcomes 
Despite a large and growing body of literature on the impact of  U.S. health insurance 
institutions on labor market outcomes, surprisingly little attention has been focused on the effect 
of U.S. health insurance institutions on health outcomes.  As Levy and Metlzer (2004) noted in a 
recent survey of the literature on health and health insurance:  “Literally hundreds of studies 
have documented the fact that the uninsured have worse health outcomes than the insured…Very 
few of these studies establish a causal relationship between health insurance and health, 
however.”  Beyond the question of whether health insurance as a general proposition impacts 
health is the question of whether, or how, the U.S. health care system impacts health. 
The U.S. system of health insurance provision is anything but stable for most individuals.  
Although some people may never experience a spell without health insurance, the type of health 
insurance coverage that individuals have is likely to change several times over the course of a 
lifetime as individuals change jobs or move between different types of public, private, or other 
coverage.  And many people will experience not only changes in the source of their health 
insurance coverage, but also intermittent or sometimes lengthy spells without any coverage.  
What implications does the patchwork-quilt nature of the U.S. health care system have for 
health? 
One way in which the system can impact both health and medical care expenditures is 
through its effect on the incentives to invest in socially efficient preventative care or disease   26 
management.  Some forms of preventative medicine have both short-term costs and short-term 
benefits (e.g., a flu vaccine).  Others, however, have short-term costs but much longer-term 
benefits (e.g., weight control, smoking cessation, diabetes management).  Under the current 
system of health insurance provision in the U.S., no one may have the appropriate incentives to 
make socially efficient investments in preventative care if the costs accrue in the short-term (or 
on an ongoing basis) but the benefits (lower costs in the future) accrue only many years hence. 
Any investments in health that yield a payoff beyond an insured’s expected tenure with 
the insurance provider (either an employer, a public insurer, or a private insurer) will not be cost 
effective for the insurer to provide.  And individuals, who are largely insensitive to the price of 
medical care by virtue of being insured, will also have little incentive to make personal 
investments today that lead to reduced social costs in the future.  Moreover, to the extent that 
some types of preventative measures involve investments that are not specific to the insurer or 
the insured (e.g., investments in computer systems to help doctors monitor patient conditions that 
are not specific to the patients covered by a particular insurer), the large number of agents in the 
current system will result in a free-rider problem and underprovision of socially valuable 
preventative investments. 
  Beaulieu, Cutler and Ho (2003) discuss these problems for the specific case of diabetes 
management.  They analyze monitoring systems that reduce the long-run costs of diabetes, but 
that yield a pay-off only over the time span of several years.  They note that from a social 
perspective, the long-run benefits of these monitoring systems far exceed the costs.  But, from 
the perspective of a profit-maximizing insurer, the private benefits to the firm are negative for 
the first few years, and the firm only begins to break even after a decade.  As a consequence,   27 
firms with high levels of turnover are unlikely to invest in such systems because other insurers 
are the ones who will reap the benefits. 
Another way in which the system can impact health is through disruptions in the 
continuity of care as individual move between different health insurance providers or between 
spells of insurance and uninsurance.  The “start-up” costs of interacting with the health system 
following a change in health insurance (e.g., finding a new doctor) may lead individuals to delay 
getting treatment.  Or, individuals who lose health insurance coverage may delay getting needed 
treatment, hoping to obtain insurance coverage before things get “too bad”.  Individuals who are 
transitioning from one doctor to another as a result of a change in health insurance coverage may 
also generate increased medical expenditures through the duplication of tests or diagnostic 
procedures done to generate measures of baseline health status or to determine an appropriate 
course of treatment.  Their health may also suffer if there are miscommunications between the 
old and new medical care providers about the nature of an individual health condition and/or its 
treatment. 
 
V.   Conclusion 
There is an important relationship between labor market outcomes and the institutions 
and rules governing health insurance provision in the U.S.  Health insurance is an important 
factor in almost every labor market decision made by individuals:  whether to work, where to 
work, and how much to work.  It is also an important factor in the human resource decisions 
made by employers:  how many workers to hire, whom to hire, and how to structure the terms 
and conditions of employment.   28 
An important lesson to be learned from the experience of the U.S. is that while employer 
provision of health insurance is a convenient way to finance insurance benefits without involving 
the government budget directly, not everyone is tied to the labor market.  Reliance on and 
encouragement of employer provision of health insurance will invariably result in government 
programs to fill in the gaps—to cover the otherwise uninsured either in whole or in part.  But it is 
the interplay between these various institutions, some tied directly to the labor market and others 
not, that results in distortions of the labor market decisions of individuals and firms.  This type of 
fragmented system may also lead to inefficiencies in the provision of health care services, such 
as inadequate investments in disease management of preventative medicine.  29 
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